Examining the Manifestation of Conflict Between the Apparent (Ẓāhirī) and Real (Wāqi'ī) Rulings and Its Effects

Compliance with rulings by the obligated party (mukallaf) is achieved according to the components and conditions that are valid within it, and results in the lapse of the obligation. All types of Sharia rulings, including the primary real ruling, secondary ruling, and apparent ruling, must be complied with. However, since there is disagreement regarding the establishment of a necessary connection between compliance with obligations according to an emergency or apparent command and its sufficiency from the primary real command, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive investigation into it. This paper addresses the issue in a descriptive-analytical manner, along with gathering information in a library format. Considering the opinion of Shiite scholars of jurisprudence (usuli) who consider the error of a mujtahid (one who exercises independent reasoning) in deriving a Sharia ruling from its evidence to be possible, another classification is presented based on the opinions of later usuli scholars and answers these questions: If the obligated party performs the "commanded act" according to the emergency ruling, and then the emergency is lifted, does it suffice from the real ruling or not? If an error is discovered in the content of the apparent ruling obtained from evidence or principle, do the actions performed according to that ruling suffice and there is no need for repetition and repayment, or does it not suffice? Ultimately, it concludes that, firstly, compliance with the secondary real command (emergency ruling) is absolutely sufficient from the primary real command. Secondly, in the event of a conflict between the apparent ruling and the certain real ruling, contrary to the opinion of the majority of usul scholars, based on how the apparent ruling is established, the causality and governance of the evidence of the apparent ruling over the real, the apparent ruling is sufficient.
Introduction:
Fulfilling an obligation based on the Sharī'ah ruling is considered compliance (Imtithāl). Thus, compliance with the Sharī'ah ruling (the obligated act) with all its conditions and parts leads to the extinguishment of the Sharī'ah ruling. Therefore, after fulfilling the obligation, there is no need for the obligated act to be performed again as either "Adā" (on-time performance) or "Qaḍā" (make-up performance). This is because if the obligated act conforms to what has been done in the external world, the Sharī'ah ruling is rationally extinguished, and there is no reason to repeat it, since it would be redundant. Moreover, a second compliance would require evidence, for which none exists. In addition, the Sharī'ah ruling is extinguished with the first compliance, and there is no need for a second one.
On the other hand, Sharī'ah rulings differ in terms of their primary real (Wāqi'ī Awallī), secondary real (Wāqi'ī Thānawī), or apparent (Ẓāhirī) nature. Furthermore, Shi'a jurists consider it possible for a Mujtahid (qualified jurist) to err in deriving a Sharī'ah ruling from its sources, and the discussion of "sufficiency" (Ajzā') in the principles of jurisprudence arises in the context of discovering such an error. Therefore, the issue of sufficiency or non-sufficiency of complying with an emergency (Iḍṭirārī) or apparent (Ẓāhirī) order in relation to the primary real (Wāqi'ī Awallī) order—whether upon the removal of the emergency or the discovery of an error in the content of the apparent ruling—is raised here. The basis of the discussion goes back to proving the necessary connection between performing obligations according to the emergency or apparent order and their sufficiency in relation to the primary real order.
Method:
This article employs a descriptive-analytical method, relying on data collection in the form of documentary information and making use of library resources.
Results and Discussion:
Firstly, based on the opinion of the majority of Usūlīs (scholars of legal principles), according to the principle of "permissibility in the state of emergency", compliance with the secondary real order (emergency ruling) is absolutely sufficient to discharge the primary real order, such as performing Tayammum (dry ablution) in a state of emergency, although a few scholars hold that the emergency ruling is established only if the excuse continues throughout the entire period of the act. Secondly, the sufficiency of the apparent ruling in relation to the real ruling can be explained based on two assumptions:

The apparent ruling contradicts the certain real ruling. In this case, the majority of scholars of legal principles, based on the requirements of principle and rule, believe that the apparent ruling is not sufficient with respect to the real ruling and that the obligation has not been discharged from the Mukallaf (legally responsible person). Therefore, upon discovering the contradiction, I'ādah (re-performance) within the prescribed time and Qaḍā (make-up) outside the time are obligatory. However, some scholars—based on the manner in which the apparent ruling is established—consider the causality and governance of the evidence of the apparent ruling over the real ruling to be sufficient.
The apparent ruling contradicts the uncertain real ruling, such as when the Mukallaf complies with the obligation according to the apparent ruling, and afterward, uncertain evidence arises against it. This contradiction may occur with presumption (Amārah) or with a practical principle (Aṣl 'Amalī). In the case of contradiction with presumption, the majority of jurists claim consensus on sufficiency in rulings but non-sufficiency in subjects. In the case of contradiction with the practical principle—whether Istishāb (presumption of continuity) or precaution (Ihtiyāt)—they hold to non-sufficiency.

Conclusion:
Compliance with an emergency command is permissible as soon as one is unable to fulfill it at the designated time, and there is no need for the obligated person to wait until the end of the time to see whether the excuse is lifted or not. If the obligated person complies with the command in any manner—whether as a real, voluntary, emergency, or apparent order—the obligation is lifted from them.